humanities.philosophy.objectivism

On Apr 10, 7:36 am, "Robert J. Kolker"
wrote:

> Relational properties are grounded in facts external to the observer.

The observer is not somehow special or privileged.

> Left and right can be determined from the co-ordinates of the objects,
> for example.

Sure, but that doesn't mean they're external to the observer. For
example, I can describe a car as "on my left" to distinguish it from
the car "on my right". These properties can be determined from co-
ordinates of objects but are not external to the observer. Similarly,
"beautiful to me" may well describe objective properties of the
objects involved, though obviously not all of them are external to me.

Again, this just shows beauty is not intrinsic, which we all agree on.

> The rrelational properties of -sets- of objects are
> intrinsic to the sets themselves, not the observers.

But observers are just as real as the things they observe. I can talk
about which sets I am a member of. I can also talk about the
properties of other observers.

If Jack is blind, then that the sky does not look blue to Jack depends
upon facts about Jack, but that doesn't somehow make it a matter of
opinion. Jack is how he is, just as the sky is how *it* is.

DS